Bureaucracy by Wellisz, Stanislaw H.
 Columbia University 
 
Department of Economics 































Department of Economics 
Columbia University 




    S. Wellisz 
 
July 2002 
Bureaucracy   
 
 
Max Weber extolled the hierarchic-bureaucratic mode of organization: 
“Experience”  - he claimed  -  “tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type 
of administrative organization... is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of 
attaining the highest degree of efficiency” (Weber, 1947, p. 337). 
 Since Weber’s time business and government  bureaucracy has flourished . 
Between 1900 and 1950 the ratio of administrative personnel  to production workers in 
U.S. industry grew from 10 per cent to 20 per cent (Bendix, 1956, p. 214)1 By 1983  it 
reached 48 per cent (Meyer, 1985, p. 37). The proportion  of government employees 
(most of whom are bureaucrats) in the civilian labor force rose in the post-World War II  
period from 10 to 16 per cent. (Meyer 1985 p. 37) A similar trend is noted throughout the 
industrialized world.   
 
Yet , far for being admired, bureaucrats – especially those working for the 
government- are looked upon as  “permanently bungling and inefficient individuals or, 
alternately, [as] individuals who carry out only those decisions that serve their own 
interests, rather than those of their superiors”(Breton and Wintrobe, 1982   pp. 6-7)  But, 
“however much people complain about the ‘evils of bureaucracy’ it would be sheer 
illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried out in 
any field except by means of officials working in offices. The whole pattern of everyday 
                                                 
1 Bendix (1956) computed three indices of bureaucratization: (1) The ratio of salaried employees to total 
employment, (2) The ratio of administrative personnel to production workers and (3) the ratio of  salaried 
personnel to the business elite (CEOs, etc.).  All three ratios displayed similar trends.  
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life is cut to fit this framework” (Weber, 1947, p.337) Out of power politicians  pledge 
that, if elected, they will curb the bureaucracy, but, when  in office they seem unwilling 
or incapable to carry out their promise.  
 
 
Our goal is to reconcile Weber’s claims in favor of bureaucracy with the 
arguments of the critics. The discussion is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present 
Weber’s case in favor of a bureaucratic mode of organization  Section 2 gives a brief  
description of major inquiries into the functioning of hierarchies. In Section 3 we present 
a simple model of an efficient Weberian bureaucracy. The Principal – Agent problem 
confronting profit-oriented enterprises is discussed in Section 4; section 5 discusses  the 
additional difficulties confronting public sector Bureaus. Niskanen’s hypothesis of a 
bureau-maximizing bureaucracy, and of bureaucracy-maximizing politicians is examined 
in Section 6. The seventh section is devoted to the issue of efficiency vs. loyalty of 
bureaucratic employees   The last section contains a brief summary of the major 
conclusions. 
 
1. Max Weber’s concept of bureaucracy 
Max Weber saw  bureaucratization as the natural consequence of  the 
development of socio-economic systems in which “every body of law consists essentially 
in a consistent system of abstract rules”. Individuals in authority  apply these rules “in the 
rational pursuit of the interests which are specified in the order governing the corporate 




“Modern  officialdom”, says Weber,  ”functions in the following specific manner: 
1.There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are 
generally ordered by rules, that is by laws or administrative regulations 
2.The authority to give commands required for the discharge of these duties is… 
strictly defined by rules concerning the coercive means… which may be placed at the 
disposal of the officials 
3….[O]nly persons who have generally regulated qualifications are employed    
In public and lawful government these three elements constitute ‘bureaucratic 
authority’. In private economic domination they constitute bureaucratic ‘management’” 
(Weber, 1946, p. 196 ) 
 
 
The term “bureaucracy” is often associated with public administration, but “[t]he 
principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures :in state 
and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organizations and private 
enterprises. It does not matter whether its authority is called ‘private’ or ‘public’”  
(Weber, 1946 p. 197) Moreover, the larger the organization, the greater the role of the 
bureaucracy (ibid. p. 334)  
 
 Efficiency calls for hierarchic organization : “The principles of office hierarchy 
and of levels of graded authority means a  firmly ordered system of super- and 
subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones 
(Weber, 1946 p. 197)”  A bureaucrat working within a hierarchic organization is 
“chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence” Bureaucrats “have a 
common  interest in seeing that the mechanism continues its function” (1946, pp. 228-
229). The acceptance of a bureaucratic post presupposes loyalty: “Entrance into an office, 
including one in the private economy, is considered an acceptance of specific obligations 
of faithful management in return for a secure existence” (1946, p. 199). Loyalty is 
essential for the good functioning of bureaus, for, “If the official stops working, or if his 
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work is forcefully interrupted, chaos results, and it is difficult to improvise replacements 
from among the governed who are fit to master such chaos” (1946, p. 229) 
 
 Bureaucrats  are professionals, “remunerated by fixed salaries… The salary scale 
is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion , 
the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent’s social status 
may be taken into account”  (1947, pp. 333-334)2  The fixed salary system is superior to 
alternate forms of remuneration:  “According to experience, the relative optimum for the 
success… of the bureaucratic apparatus is offered by a secure money salary that is 
connected with the opportunity of a career that is not dependent upon mere accident or 
arbitrariness”. Moreover, “it is a matter of principle that the members of the 
administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of the means of 
production or administration” (1947 p. 331)  
  
 The superiority of the bureaucratic-hierarchic mode of organization lies in the 
“exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature which makes it 
specifically rational”.  Knowledge includes “technical knowledge which, by itself, is 
sufficient to ensure a position of extraordinary power” and also  “knowledge growing out 
of experience in the service” (1947, p. 339). “[O]nly a person who has demonstrated an 
adequate technical training is qualified to be a member of the administrative staff” (1947, 
p.331). “Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who have specialized 
training and who by constant practice learn more and more” (1946 p. 215) Knowledge is 
                                                 
2 Elsewhere (1946, p. 203) Weber states that “The salary is not measured like a wage in terms of work 
done, but according to ‘status’, that is, according to the kind of function (the ‘rank’) and, in addition, 
possibly, according to length of service” 
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power, hence “Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally 
informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret”(1946, p. 233) 
2. Models of hierarchic systems 
 The formal study of hierarchic structures was initiated by Oliver Williamson. 
(1967). Williamson assumed that the head of an enterprise is endowed with superior 
knowledge which is passed, in the form of orders, to lower levels of the hierarchy, and, 
ultimately to the production  workers. “[O]nly a fraction α (0< α < 1) of the intentions of 
the superior are effectively satisfied by a subordinate”, hence “control loss is strictly 
cumulative… across successive hierarchic levels”(Williamson, 1967 p. 127) As a 
consequence, the efficiency of the  production workers is proportional to αn where n is 
the number of hierarchic levels. Williamson demonstrated that if α =1 (i.e. in the no-loss-
of-control case), the number of hierarchic layers does not set a limit to firm size. For 
 α <1, however, the greater the degree of loss of control (i.e. the smaller the α ) the lower 
the firm size limit.3 
 
 Williamson’s paper stimulated far-ranging research into the structure and the 
characteristics of hierarchic-bureaucratic organizations. Calvo and Wellisz (1978) 
demonstrated that full effort can be elicited from the employees if they are offered an 
appropriate  “package” of reward for work – punishment of shirking . The closeness of 
effort monitoring, they assumed, is a declining function of the number of  supervisees per 
supervisor, hence, as the ratio rises, the probability of an employee being caught shirking 
declines. To insure that the employees give full effort, it is necessary, therefore to raise 
the reward for work  At a certain point (defined as the Span of Control”) it is less costly 
                                                 
3 A formal proof of the proposition that the limit of the efficient size of the hierarchy depends crucially on 
the loss-of-control assumption  was given by  Mirrlees (1976) and  by  Calvo (1977)). 
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to interpose between the “boss” and the workers a supervisory layer, and the same holds 
true for further expansion. Calvo and Wellisz  demonstrated that if it is profitable  to 
build a two-layer (“boss” + production workers) organization, then the larger enterprise,  
(hence the larger the number of hierarchic layers) the greater the ultimate claimant’s rent. 
Thus   “loss of control”, defined in terms of on-the job shirking   is preventable, and it 
does not limit the size of the enterprise. 
 
 Keren and Levhari (1979) look at a hierarchic firm as a problem-solving machine. 
They take “a productive structure of given size has come into being and that a 
superstructure has to be set up to prepare for a coordinated plan of action” (1979, p. 
1163). The assumption is that the members of each hierarchic level work concurrently, 
while members of the immediately superior or inferior level await the outcome of their 
work and start when the adjacent level has finished. Delay in time completion is costly, 
but the costs also rise as the number of non-production workers increases. Keren ad 
Lehvari  show the relation between the cost of time, the wage level, and the optimal ratio 
of supervisees/supervisor at each hierarchic level. 
 
 Qian (1994) provides a general solution to the organizational design problem of a 
hierarchy. He takes as a datum the state of the technology and the capital stock of an 
enterprise, and provides a simultaneous solution for the optimal number of hierarchic 
levels, the span of control, and the wage scale. Qian shows that on the optimal hierarchy 
in which all managers and workers are identical ex ante , wages fall and efforts decrease 
as one moves from top to bottom of a hierarchy; as the size of the hierarchy increases, 
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both efforts and wages of managers at the top increase because their marginal product 
increases (Qian, 1994, p. 528)  
 
 
 Two recent papers Garicano (2000) and Beggs (2000) address the problem of 
utilization of knowledge in a hierarchic organization. Garicano looks at hierarchies as 
devices to reduce the cost of acquisition of specialized knowledge:  
“Workers can learn the solution to the problems they confront at a cost… A worker in 
autarchy … learns the most frequent problems and ignores the rest… Organization allows 
different workers to acquire different knowledge sets and communicate knowledge as 
required. This has two advantages: first, it allows workers to increase the utilization rate 
of knowledge, decreasing the per capita learning cost; second, it allows more knowledge 
to be acquired and used in solving problems. But it also incurs two new costs: matching 
the problem with the workers who know it and communicating the answer” Garicano 
(2000) p.878)).  
 
Knowledge-acquisition costs are reduced if the enterprise is organized in a hierarchical 
fashion: 
 
“If communication is available, workers do not need to acquire all the knowledge 
necessary to produce. Instead, they may acquire only the most relevant knowledge and, 
when confronted with a problem they cannot solve, ask someone else. The organization  
must then decide who must learn what and whom each worker should ask when 
confronted with an unknown problem” (ibid. p.875) 
 
 “Production know-how is…often… “embodied” in individuals. [I]n this case, it is 
natural to organize knowledge as a “knowledge-based hierarchy”. In such a structure, 
knowledge of solutions to most common or easiest problems  is located in the production 
floor, whereas knowledge about more exceptional or harder problems is located  in higher 
Production workers learn how to solve the most common and the easiest problems. The 
more exceptional and the harder problems are solved at successively higher hierarchic 
levels (“management by exception”). 
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 Any individual’s time, hence his problem-solving capacity, is limited. “By adding 
layers of problem solvers, the organization increases the utilization rate of knowledge, 
thus economizing on knowledge acquisition, at the cost of increasing the communication  
required. The limited availability of time counters the returns arising from fixed costs, 
resulting in a limited span of control of problem solvers” ( ibid. 875)   
  
 Beggs addresses the problem of hierarchic allocation of workers who differ in 
ability where “Abler workers are capable of making (good) decisions in a wider range of 
tasks than less able ones”  (Beggs, 2000 p. 297) An organization can reduce costs by 
employing unskilled workers for routine tasks. But problems which  low-skill workers 
cannot solve have to be passed on to higher-skill individuals, causing (costly) delays.  
Beggs applies the queuing theory to investigate the relation between the cost of delays, as 
well as the effect of the wage structure and of the range of tasks on the optimal structure 
of the hierarchy. He proves, inter alia, that (1) higher levels of organization have fewer 
workers than lower ones (2) that it pays to place the more able workers on higher 
hierarchic levels. Thus from the point of view of the residual claimant (who may not be a 
member of the hierarchy), it is rational to give the most able individual the position of the 
“boss”. 
 
3. A simple Weberian model 
 We propose to present a very parsimonious model that displays the advantages 
which Weber claimed for a rationally organized bureaucracy, and, in particular for his 
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claim of rational use, rather than rational acquisition, of knowledge.  In our scheme 
superiors issue orders to their immediate subordinates. In the spirit of Weber we assume 
that the recipients strive to execute the orders, but how well they execute them, depends 
on their qualifications.  We  investigate under what conditions it is profitable for an 
Agent to become a head of a hierarchic organization, rather than to bean employee or to 
be self-employed. We demonstrate that it never pays for the head of a hierarchy to hire 
individuals with higher qualifications than his owns, and that it is rational to place the 
more qualified individuals on the higher rungs of a hierarchy.  
   
  
 Let there be an economy in which the agents have the choice of  (i) self-
employment, (ii) of being employed by a hierarchic enterprise as a worker or as a 
bureaucrat or  (iii) of  heading an enterprise. An Agent cannot have more than one 
occupation. All work is equally onerous and psychically equally rewarding, hence in 
choosing between any two occupations, an Agent will rationally choose the one which 
yields the higher utility of income4. 
 
  We shall use the term hierarchy, as defined by Radner, to denote  a ranked tree, 
where: 
 
 “A Tree is a collection of objects, together with a relation among them, to be 
called here “superior to”. This relation has the following properties: 1. Transitivity - if A 
is superior to B, and B is superior to C, then A is superior to C,  2. Antisymmetry - if A is 
superior to B, then B is not superior to A. 3 That is exactly one object called the root, that 
is superior to all  the other objects.4. Except for the root [i.e. the head of the hierarchic 
organization], every object has exactly one superior” (Radner, 1992  p. 1390)  
 
                                                 
4 Activities (i) and (ii) may call for a capital investment, but we assume that the financial market is 
perfectly competitive, that all investments are risk-less, and there is no moral hazard, hence we do not have 
to take into account any financial considerations. 
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Rank  is assigned  in the following manner:  
 “1. If A is superior to B then it has a higher rank 2. If A and B have the same rank, then 
they are comparable, i.e. A is not superior to B, nor is B superior to A” (Ibid. p. 1391). 
 The higher ranking individuals issue orders to the lower-ranking ones, who are supposed 
to execute their superiors’ directives.  
We shall define as bureaucrats the individuals who occupy intermediate positions 
between the decision maker (the entrepreneur, the boss) and the workers5. . Bureaucrats 
are, at once, subordinates and superiors. The top-ranking ones are directly responsible to 
the decision-makers; those at the bottom are in direct control of the workers. The role of 
the bureaucrats is to monitor and coordinate the activities of their immediate 
subordinates, to transfer to lower layers the orders of the decision-makers, and to transmit 
information signals to their superiors. Bureaucrats also have decision-making functions: 
 “Information from the field flowing up to the decision makers at the apex of the 
bureau must be synthesized by lower- level bureaucrats so that only the most relevant 
information moves upward and in condensed form, Similarly, commands flowing down 
tend to be very general at first.  It is the task of those at lower levels to interpret these 
commands, flesh them out, make them specific, and apply them to concrete problems” 
                                                 
5 The terms “bureau” and “bureaucrat” are applied differently by different authors. For 
Von Mises “Bureaucratic management is the method applied to the conduct of 
administrative affairs the result of which has no cash value in the market”(Von Mises, 
1944, p. 47) Niskanen defines bureaus as “those organizations which have both of the 
following characteristics: 1. The owners and employees of these organizations do not 
appropriate any part of the difference between revenues and costs as personal income 
2 Some part of the recurring revenues of the organization derive from other than the sale 
of output at a per-unit rate” (Niskanen, 1994 p.15) At times  he applies the term 
“bureaucrat”  “to define any full-time employee of a bureau”. For the most part, however, 
he uses the term  “ to define  the senior official of any bureau with a separate identifiable 
budget” (ibid. 22), Niskanen acknowledges, however,  that “From Weber to Galbraith… 
“bureaucracy” has been used by many scholars in reference to all large modern 





(Breton and Wintrobe 1982 p.39) 
 
The need for bureaucracy arises out of the limits of the head of an organization’s 
capacity for decision-making. Decision-making requires time.  In a small organization the 
boss is able to direct  the performance of all his employees. But as the size and the 
complexity of the enterprise increases, the “boss” has less and less time to devote to any 
problem. As a consequence, the proportion of “right” decision declines6. At some point 
the “boss” has to decide whether to forego further expansion, or to delegate some 
decision tasks to a lower hierarchic level. To simplify the exposition , and without loss of 
generality, we shall assume that the effectiveness of decision-making is invariant for n, 
the supervisee/supervisor ratio less than or equal to n*, and that it falls discontinuously if 
the ratio rises to (n*+1). We shall call n* the span of control. 
 
 
Economic Agents can be characterized in terms of their “competence” or “skills”  
or “qualifications”- expressions which we shall use  as synonyms for Weber’s 
“technological knowledge”. The level of competence depends on an Agent’s inborn 
ability, diligence, education, and on other factors, such as the length of work experience. 
The level of competence will be indicated by a subscript, with o indicating the highest 
level, and higher digits successively lower levels. When working in isolation , an Agent 
of type Ai  produces ai. Competence is   completely generalized: If an Agent of type Ai  is  
β times more efficient than Agent of type Aj at some task x, he is  β times more efficient 
than agent Aj at any other task x’ . We can think of effectiveness and of efficiency in 
terms of binary (“right” or “wrong”) decisions. All Agents are capable of making the 
same number of decisions per unit time, but they differ in terms of  the  (expected) 
                                                 
6  For a discussion of limited attention as a determinant of the span of control, see Gifford (1992) 
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right/wrong decision ratio. All right (wrong) decisions made on a given hierarchic level 
counting from the bottom have the same positive (negative) payoffs 
 
The effectiveness of the Agents employed in hierarchic organizations  depends on 
their own competence, as well as on the effectiveness  of their superiors.  The 
effectiveness of  platoon commander depends on his courage and ability, but also on the 
commands he receives from his superior officer – and ultimately from on the competence 
of the Head of the Armed Forces. In business the effectiveness of a salesman depends on 
his skill, but also on the effectiveness of the branch sales manager, whose effectiveness, 
in turn, reflects on his own capability, and that of the head of marketing – and, ultimately 
on the skills of  the CEO.  
 
 We shall indicate by aij the effectiveness of an Aj – type Agent working under an  
Ai – type supervisor. The magnitude of the aij coefficient depends on the degree of  pass-
through of skill.  In the general case  ai ≥ aij ≥ aj for all j  ≥i (i,j = m.... 1, 0) When pass-
through is complete, aij = ai; if no skill is transferred aij = aj. The higher the effectiveness 
of the supervisor, the greater the pass-through of skill  to his supervises, so that  ∂aij /∂ai > 
0. Given the supervisor’s effectiveness, the higher the supervisees’ qualifications, the 
greater his effectiveness as a hierarchic employee, hence  aij > aik  for all k>j 7. We shall 
assume that the “skills” that are passed through within an organization are specific to that 
organization. Thus as long as an Aj – type Agent works as a subordinate of an Ai –type 
                                                 
7  This assumption is also made by Qian (1994). In his scheme, however,(as in Calvo-Wellisz, 1978) the 
head of the organization is the only one endowed with superior knowledge, while all other members of a 
hierarchic organization are identical 
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Agent, his effectiveness  is aij  , but  once he quits his job, his level of qualification reverts 
to ai.8  
  
In a profit-oriented hierarchic structure an entrepreneur earns a  rent R = Q – W, 
where Q is the value of the output and W the wage bill.  In a two-level organization, in 
which an Ai  entrepreneur supervises  n  Aj-type production workers 
( where  Ai = or ≠ Aj ) the entrepreneur’s rent can be written as: 
 Rij =  n*(aij  - wj)        (1) 
To attract employees, the wage wj offered to Aj –type Agents  has to be at least as 
high as their self-employment opportunity cost. The profit-maximizing entrepreneur 
offers the lowest wage compatible with the participation constraint, hence, if some Ak- 
types are self-employed, then wj  = aj , and (1) can be re-written to read:   
Rij =  n*(aij -aj)        (1a)        
We can now demonstrate the following propositions: 
1. An Economic Agent becomes an entrepreneur if his rent is at least equal to the 
wage he could earn as a worker or a bureaucrat, or at least equal to his self-employment 
earnings, whichever is higher. 
The proof is immediate. Since all tasks are equally difficult and all bring the same  
psychic utility,  an  Ai  -type Agent will become the head of a business if and only if  
 Rij ≥ ai  if ai ≥ axi  and Rij ≥ axi  if    ai ≤ axi for any axi 
 
                                                 
8  A similar assumption is made by Rajan and Zingales  in whose scheme “Because superiors assign 
subordinates tasks to complement their own skills, managers [intermediate level employees] once 
specialized, are useless without their superior and can produce only in a team that contains the superior” 
However in their scheme managers who interact directly with the principal can partially appropriate his 
technology (Rajan and Zingales  2002, p. 808) while we rule out the possibility of such appropriation. 
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2. It does not pay to for an individual to organize an enterprise and to hire 
personnel with equal or higher qualifications than his own. 
Let an Aj –type (try to) organize an enterprise, and hire  Aj -type workers , where  
ai ≥ aj . To attract the employees, the wage he offers must be at least as high as their 
opportunity cost.  Since the opportunity cost of  Ai type individuals  is equal or greater 
than their self-employment earnings  ai, 9  it follows that: wi ≥ ai . Writing Rji  for the 
entrepreneurial rent accruing to a Aj  -type boss who hires n* employees each of whom 
has an “inherent efficiency”  ai and commands a wage wi = ai, we get: 
 Rji   = n*(aji   - wi).   
But  aji   ≤ ai , while  wi ≥ ai , hence Rji ≤ 0 (with  inequality  for j>i, and  equality for j=i). 
The prospective entrepreneur would earn zero rent if his employees had qualifications 
equal to his, and a negative rent if he a negative rent if they were more qualified.  
 
3. An Ai type Agent  would gain by organizing an enterprise and by hiring n*  
employees who are less qualified than he is if the  pass-through of competence is so high, 
that the value of output  of the enterprise net of  wages paid to the employees at 
opportunity cost exceeds the  Agent’s opportunity cost. 
4. The entrepreneur’(net)  rent (Rij - ai ), over and above  his self – employment 
opportunity cost  is the higher,  the higher the larger the span of control n*, and the 
greater the difference between the effectiveness  of an   Aj type worker supervised by an 
Ai -type superior, and the Aj productivity in self-employment..   
 Again, the proof is immediate. Write 
                                                 
9 The opportunity cost of  Ai -type agents  equals ai when some such agents are self-employed, but it may 
be higher if all such agents are either heads of employees of  hierarchic enterprises.  
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  Rij= n*(aij – wj) ≥ai        (2) 
where Rij  is the rent accruing to the Ai -type entrepreneur who employs n*  Aj –type  
workers.  If some Aj – types are self-employed, then wj = ai , the entrepreneurial rent can  
be expressed as: 
             Rij= n*(aij – aj) ≥ai        (2a)  
 It is obvious that Rij increases in n* and in *(aij – aj)  
 
 5. The advantage of a m-tier over an (m-1) – tier organization is the greater, the 
 greater the span of control, the higher the pass-through of competence,, the greater the  
difference between the qualifications of the head of the enterprise and his employees, and  
the lower  the opportunity cost of the latter. 
Consider the problem facing the head of an enterprise who personally supervises  
n* workers. To expand his enterprise, the “boss” would have to interpose a level of 
bureaucratic employees between himself and the workers. Assuming the constancy of the 
span of control across the levels10, the entrepreneur could supervise n* bureaucrats, and 
each bureaucrat could supervise n* workers. The number of production workers would 
grow from n* to n*2. If the bureaucrats are of the   Aj –type, while the workers are of the  
Ak type (where Aj = or ≠ Ak ) production will be equal  n*2 aijk , where  aijk stands for the 
productivity of an Ak type worker working under the supervision of an Aj type bureaucrat 
responsible to an Ai type  boss. We can express the entrepreneurial rent from a 3-level 
                                                 
10.   Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1988) assume that the number of layers is limited 
by a binding constraint, in which case the lower the level, the smaller  the  span of control. Qian (1994) has 
shown that in the continuous case the endogenously determined optimal span of control is constant  across 




 Rijk = n*2 aijk –( n*wj  +n*2 wk).      (3) 
 
Assuming that some of the Aj and Ak type individuals are self-employed, the  
above can be re-written as: 
 
Rijk = n*2aijk –( n*aj  + n*2ak)      (3a) 
Subtracting (2a) from (3a) we get as a condition of profitability of expansion 
from a 2-tier to a 3-tier hierarchy 
n*(aijk – ak ) – aij ≥ 0         
The meaning of the above condition becomes clearer if we consider the 
 case of  a specific pass-through function Let us assume that: 
aij =  αai+ (1- α) aj 11       (4) 
from which:  
  aijk =  α2ai+ α(1- α) aj +( 1 + α)ak      (5) 
If the enterprise head is of type A0, while the labor force is homogenous we can 
 write   
 ai = a0 and  aj = ak =  a1 , then  
 R011 = n*2 [α 2a0+ α(1-α) a1 +(1+α)a1] – (n*2 + n*) a1 =  
 = n*2α 2 a0 - n 2 α2a1 -n*a1  
 while   
 
R01 = n*[  αa0+ (1-α) a1] - n* a1   = n*αa0  - n* a1    
from which 
                                                 
11   It will be readily seen that the formulation conforms to our earlier assumptions: If α =1, the supervisee 
acquires the supervisor’s level of technical skill; if α =0, the supervisee’s performance is unaffected by that 
of the supervisor .It is also clear that  ∂aij /∂ai > 0. and  aij > aik  for all k>j 
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 R011 – R01 = n*[(n* α 2 -  α) (a0 - a1 ) - a1 ] 
It pays to expand an enterprise from two to three levels if 
 R011 – R01 ≥ 0, that is if:     
(n*α 2 -  α) (a0 - a1 ) ≥ a1        
The proof can readily be extended to any m>2. 
6. If the labor force is heterogeneous , the less qualified  individuals should be 
engaged as workers, and the more qualified ones as bureaucrats. 
Let there be two types of Agent, A1 and A2 , where a1 > a2, and let (4) be the pass-
through function.  Compare the rental yielded by a three-tier organization which employs 
n*  A1 -type bureaucrats and n*2  A2 – type  workers with one which employs n* A2-type 
bureaucrats and  n* 2 A2 – type  workers.  From (5) it follows that: 
R012 = n*2 { α2 a02 + α( 1 –  α) a1 + ( 1 –  α) a2 } – (n*w1  + n*2 w2 } 
            R022 = n*2 { α2 a02 + α( 1 –  α) a2 + ( 1 –  α) a2 } – (n*w2  + n*2 w2 } 
From which: 
 R012  -  R022  = n*2 α( 1 –  α) (a1 – a2 ) – n(w1 - w2 ) 
If  w1 = a1  and w2   = a2 , then  R012  >  R022   provided that α(1-  α) > n*, but since n≥2 and 
α ≤1 this condition is always satisfied. It is therefore profitable to place more skilled 
individuals on higher rungs of the hierarchy. 
From the above it follows immediately that: 
7. It is never profitable to place a more qualified individual under the supervision 
of one who is less skilled  
If an A 2-type worker were replaced by an A 1-type worker  output would grow by 
(a021  -  a022 ). Applying (4) we see that output growth would amount to  (a1 - a2 )( (1-α) . 
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At the same time the wage bill would grow by (w1 – w2 ). If  wi  =  ai , (I=1,2), then  
the wage bill growth would amount to  (a1 - a2 ).  Since α > 0, the growth in output is less 
than the growth in the wage bill, which means that it will never be profitable to place an 
A1-type worker under an A2 –type supervisor.  
 
 Under some circumstances  (a war emergency, for example), maximum output, 
rather than maximum profit is the goal. It can be shown that if the span of control is 
small, and the transfer coefficient is low, output can be raised more by making a “high 
tech” individual into a worker instead of making him a bureaucrat. In such a situation, 
however, the replacement of a low-tech by a high tech individual raises production cost.   
 Consider, again, an enterprise which employs only  A2 –types. One A1 –type 
becomes available for employment.. If he replaced an  A2 – type bureaucrat, output of the 
organization would increase by: 
∆Q(I) = {n[α2a0+ α(1-α) a1 +( 1 + α)a2]} - {n[α 2 a0+ α(1-α) a2 +( 1 + α)a2]} 
where the expression in the first {} bracket shows the output of a team consisting of an 
A1 – type bureaucrat working under an Ao – type principal, and supervising n* A2 – type   
workmen, while the second bracket shows the output of a team consisting of an A2 – type  
bureaucrat working under an Ao – type principal, and supervising n* A2 – type workmen. 
On the other hand , if the  A1 – type replaced one A2 – type  worker, output would 
grow by: 
∆Q(II)  = (α2a0+ α(1-α) a2 +( 1 + α)a1 }- { α 2 a0+ α(1-α) a1 +( 1 + α)a1} 
By substitution  and rearrangement of terms, it can be shown that  Strategy I 
raises output  by more  than Strategy II,  as long  as 
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 nα ≥ 1    
As long as  α >1/2 , the output  of the smallest viable team, consisting of  a supervisor 
and two supervisees can be raised more by putting the A1 type in the supervisory position 
rather than   making him into a supervisee. The larger the team, the smaller the critical 
size of n. Thus even if the size of the output is the critical organization the rule of placing 
the higher qualified individuals in the higher position generally holds. 
 
  Let us now define the economically optimal level of bureaucracy. We shall focus 
our attention on the public sector bureaucracy, particularly vulnerable to criticism – and 
assume, as is done in Findlay and Wilson (1987) that all the  final goods and services are 
produced under competitive conditions by the private sector while the public sector  
produces an intermediate good, such as “law and order”.  The production function can be 
written as:   
 Y = A(LG )F( K, LP)        (6)  
In  the private sector  LP labor is to applied to K, a fixed volume of capital. The public 
sector utilizes labor only to produce the factor-augmenting intermediate product A.  
All labor is drawn from a common pool, 
  LG + LP = L          (7)  
The wage is equal to the marginal product of labor in the private sector: 
 w = A LP          (8) 
 We shall assume that Agents in the private, perfectly competitive system strive to  
maximize their income. The decision-maker in the public  sector strives to  
maximize the Gross National Product. Maximization of Y with respect to LG (taking into 
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account (7) yields the first order condition: 
 A’ F( K, LG) = A LP         (9) 
Where the LHS represents the marginal product of labor in the public, and the RHS  the 
marginal product of labor in the private sector. At the optimum level  of government 
employment, LG*,  the marginal product of labor in both sectors is equal, and national 
income is maximized. Efficient allocation of public sector labor implies that the number 
of government bureaucrats is an increasing function of government employment. It 
follows that given  LG* we can determine the economically optimal number of   
government  bureaucrats LGB* 
 
 To sum up. A Weberian bureaucracy utilizes “knowledge” in an efficient manner. 
Where  the public sector decision-makers is to maximize GNP, both the  number of  
public sector bureaucrats and the output of  intermediate public  goods in at an optimum.  
 
4  Bureaucracy and the Principal-Agent Problem 
 In his discussion of bureaucracy Weber assumed that the Principal of a hierarchic 
organization and all his Agents were driven by the same motives. This assumption might 
be true if the organization is a fire fighters’ brigade, or an army driven by patriotic 
motives.  In his well-known critique of the public sector bureaucracy Von  Mises  
asserted that there was also  unity of purpose among employees of  profit-oriented  
entities imbedded in a competitive system . Competition, Von Mises claims, solves  
costlessly the Principal-Agent problem.  
“[T]he working of the capitalist system forces the entrepreneur to obey the orders issued 
by the consumers… He does not have the power to distribute bounties at the expense of 
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the consumers… The same relation that exists between the general manager and his 
immediate subordinates, the heads of the various sections, pervades the whole business 
hierarchy. Every section head values his immediate subordinates according to the same 
principle  by which the chief manager values him, and the foreman applies similar 
methods in appraising his subordinates… It does not matter whether piece rates or hourly 
wages are paid. In the long run the worker can never get more than the consumer 
allows”(Von Moses, 1944, p.37) 
 
To paraphrase Von Mises: Consider a perfectly competitive economy. In the long  
run equilibrium a firm imbedded in such an economy makes a zero profit. To make zero 
profits, all jobs must be allocated so as to maximize efficiency (as discussed above). In 
appointing the general manager the ultimate claimant must, therefore, be guided solely by 
considerations of profitability, and the same holds true of the appointments of all 
subordinates made by their superiors.  If   any Agent fails to work with full efficiency, the 
firm makes a loss, and the Agent loses his job, hence no agent will shirk on the job. 
Though Agents work as a team, there is no free-rider problem, because every Agent’s 
performance is critical.12 
 
  The Von Mises  argument does not hold, however, in the presence of uncertainty.  
Even if the expected value of profits for any firm is zero, short-run profits  may be 
positive or negative. Let π be the profit which an enterprise expects to realize in the short 
run, under the assumption that no employee shirks , and let  ρi be the ith employee’s 
contribution to the profit. Under the (extreme) assumption that a one-period loss would 
lead to liquidation, the ith employee would have an incentive to work only if his effort 
was  critical, that is  if π≥0 while (π - ρi ) <0. If  π<0 the enterprise would go bankrupt 
whether he worked or not, hence he would be better off if he relaxed and enjoyed on-the-
                                                 
12 One could, of course, raise the objection that if all Agents are paid at their opportunity cost, they suffer 
no loss from the collapse of the firm that employs them, hence no one who is paid per unit time has any 
incentive to work. 
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job leisure. If  (π - ρi ) ≥0, the enterprise would show a profit whether he worked or not. It 
is clear ρi increases with the ith Agent’s hierarchic rank. Under our assumptions if the 
“boss” shirks, the enterprise makes a loss, hence the  (assuming that the magnitude of the 
loss is a matter of indifference) the “boss’s”  effort is critical except when bankruptcy is 
inevitable. But in the absence of a reward-and-punishment system, a production worker 
in a large enterprise has little if any incentive to work.  
 
Let us define an efficient incentive scheme instituted by a competitive profit-
oriented enterprise13. The principal, acting as a Stackelberg leader, monitors the 
employee’s performance; he pays w to an employee whose performance is satisfactory, 
and metes out punishment k if performance is below standard14  Employees  seek to 
maximize their utility, derived from their earnings w and from on-the-work leisure, hence 
u(w,e) with  ∂u/∂w > 0 and  ∂u/∂e < 0 We  assume that π, the probability an Agent’s work 
being found to be unsatisfactory, increases in the intensity of monitoring m, and that it 
decreases  with the employee’s  effort, i.e. π(e,m)  (where 0≤e≤1 and 0≤m≤1)  with   π’m 
< 0 for e<1 and π’e >0 for m>0 ,  π(e,0) = 1 and  π(1,m) = 1. 
 
The wage-punishment  “package” offered by the enterprise must yield at least as 
much utility u(v) as the prospective employee’s opportunity cost. Assume, as earlier, that 
the alternative is self-employment, yielding utility u(s) with probability 1.  We shall 
express a prospective employee’s participation constraint in the form of a the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern function: 
                                                 
13 A formal proof of the propositions that follow will be found in Calvo and Wellisz,(1978) and (1979). 
14 For the sake of simplicity do not discuss a finer grading of the employee’s performance. 
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u(v) = π (m,e)u(w,e) + (1- π (m,e)) u ( k) ≥u(s) (10)    
The  problem of the Principal in a profit-oriented enterprise is to choose w, k, and 
the intensity of monitoring m so as to induce a profit-maximizing effort on the part of the 
employees:  
           Max Π = e(w, k, m  ) - c(w, m  )                                                                         (11)   
            w,k,m 
 
 
(where   e’(w) >0, e’/k/ > 0, e’(m) > 0, c’(w)>0 and  c’(m) >0)) 
The  severity of  punishment is limited by custom, by law, or by agreement. Writing k for 
actual punishment and k for the most severe punishment that is permitted, we have: 
│k│≤ │k│                          (12) 
From the Principal’s point of view punishment is costless, hence he will set it at the 
maximum permissible level.  
The Principal will seek to maximize (11) subject to (10) and to (12) and offer a 
least cost (i.e. profit maximizing) “package” v*(w*,m*, k ) acceptable to the employees, 
where:    
 v* =[π(m , e (w*,m*,k))]u( w*)  +[1- π(m*, e(w*,m*.k*))]u (k)         
In the absence of a limit on the severity of  punishment, the entrepreneur could 
solve the Principal-Agent problem without incurring hardly any cost. He  could offer  to 
the  Ai  - types a wage wi = ai, and elicit full effort by keeping monitoring to a minimum 
necessary to create a credible threat of punishment.  But since ∂u/∂e<0 and e’(/k/) >0 , it 
follows that ∂e/∂/k/ < 0, i.e that other things being equal, the less severe the punishment, 
the lower the effort, hence the higher the cost of a unit output of labor. If the worse that 
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can happen to an employee is to be discharged, he will perform no work, unless he is 
offered a wage  higher than his self-employment opportunity cost.  At equilibrium  
∂e/∂m = ∂e/∂w, which means that the higher the marginal cost of monitoring, the higher 
the wage needed to elicit effort, and the higher the cost of the product of labor. Thus even 
in the case of pure competition there is a  wedge between the enterprise labor cost and the 
opportunity cost of the wage-earners. 
 
 5. Problem of the public sector bureaucracy. 
 
 The incentive problems faced by public sector, non-profit oriented Bureaus are 
greatly more severe than those facing competitive profit-oriented enterprise.   
  
“The objectives of public administration cannot be measured in money terms and cannot 
be checked by accountancy methods… In public administration there is no market price 
for achievements. This makes it indispensable to operate public office according to 
principles entirely different from those applied under the profit motive” (Von Mises, 
1944 p. 47) 
 
In the absence of a simple, measurable objective, such as profit maximization, in 
choosing his subordinates the head of a Bureau may be motivated by considerations other 
than those of efficiency: 
 
“The seller-buyer nexus as well as the employer-employee  relation, in a profit-
seeking business is purely matter of fact and impersonal. It is a deal from which both 
parties derive an advantage…. But it is different with a bureaucratic organization. There 
the nexus between  superior and subordinate is personal. The subordinate depends on the 
superior’s judgment of his personality, not of his work” (ibid. p. 53) 
 
The professionalization of the civil service is a guard against biased treatment. 
Posts are filled on the basis of  objective criteria, such as the educational attainment and 
the length of service. “Objective measures are characterized by the fact that they can be 
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verified for contractual purposes “. The subjective criteria, which are barred , include 
“anything that is not verifiable by a third party” (Prendegast, 1999 p.12)  The elimination 
of the subjective criteria narrows the set of signals used for evaluation and for the 
determination of rewards and punishment , and  reduces  efficiency of the system (see 
Holmstrom, 1979). The exclusive reliance on  objective criteria may have perverse 
effects, for: 
  ”this machinery for selection sometimes bars the competent men from a job and 
does not always prevent the appointment of an utter incompetent. But the worst effect 
produced is that the main concern of the clerks is to comply with these and other 
formalities. They forget that their job is to perform an assigned duty as well as possible” 
(Von Mises, op. cit. p.55)  
 
The civil servants’ duties  are often subdivided into well defined, readily measurable 
tasks, such as the filing of reports, the issuance of certificates, and other activities 
commonly referred to as “red tape”. Here, too, there is gain in objectivity, at the expense 
of efficiency.  The effect of the exclusive reliance on objective criteria means that the 
public sector bureaucrats are less closely monitored than their profit-oriented sector 
counterparts. A Civil Servant’s career is determined by his formal qualifications and his 
fulfillment of his duties. Effort, over and above a set minimum, is not rewarded.  
 
It can be readily shown that the wedge the cost of labor and the opportunity cost 
of the Agents is wider in the case of public sector bureaus than in the case of profit-
oriented enterprises. To compete for labor with the private sector, the public sector wage-
monitoring-punishment  offer (wcs mcs, ,kcs )  must be  as attractive as the conditions  
offered by private business. But business offers the least-cost “package” (w* m* k), 
hence any other “package”, such as  (wcs ,  mcs kcs )  must be more expensive. The “Civil 
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Service” package involves less pay  and lower penalties than the business ”package”, 
hence it elicits less effort.15 The Civil Service employees tend to work less hard and enjoy 
more on the job leisure then private business bureaucrats, because the latter are better 
rewarded for good performance, and face more severe 16. As a consequence, more 
employees are needed to perform a given task. Bureaus do not do too much; the 
bureaucrats do too little. But, given the Civil Service constraints, the size of the 
bureaucracy cannot be squeezed down without reducing the supply of public goods. 
 
  
6.The Niskanen hypothesis 
 
 
In his  1971 book Niskanen advanced  arguments that the it is in the interest of the  
public sector bureaucrats as well as in the interest of the politicians who oversee their 
activities to over-expand the public sector bureaus.  The heads of bureaus seek to 
maximize the number of employees, because the their rank their prestige and their salary 
are the higher the larger their bureau. The subordinates also have a vested interest in the 
growth of the bureau size, since the larger the bureau, the more possibilities of hierarchic 
advancement.17  In the US, the relationship between the government bureaus and the 
political establishment is one of bilateral monopoly. A given public service is, typically, 
provided by only one bureau, and every bureau comes under the supervision of a   
Secretary (or one of his subordinates) and/or of a House committee. Committees for each 
                                                 
15 The incentive effect of wages is also blunted insofar as advancement depends upon the length rather than 
the quality of service. 
16 If the population is heterogeneous in terms of attitudes toward work, self-selection may take place. 
Individuals with high preference for security and/or on the job leisure might opt for civil service jobs; those 
with a low degree of risk aversion and/or low preference for on the job leisure would opt for the profit-
oriented sector. 
17 The idea of a bureau-maximizing bureaucracy was originally advanced by Parkinson (1957), but it 
gained the profession’s attention only after  Niskanen’s formalization . 
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service are likely to be dominated by the groups with the highest relative demand for the 
service (Niskanen, 1971, p. 139). Groups that have a high demand for a given service are 
also likely to exercise pressure on the government. Groups that oppose high level supply 
are likely to remain silent, unless they have to pay a tax designated to finance the service 
in question, hence the weakness of the forces favoring budgetary restraint. As a 
consequence Bureaus grow to the point at which the Social Surplus created by their 
activities is exhausted by Bureau costs, or up to the point at which the marginal product is 
zero – whichever comes earlier. 
      
                                                            
Niskanen’s analysis stimulated the construction of models of interaction between 
public-support-seeking politicians, bureau-size-maximizing bureaucrats and utility-
maximizing voters.18 His behavioral hypotheses provoked  controversy and incited 
attempts at empirical verification.  Not surprisingly, it was easy to demonstrate that  “the 
great majority of bureaucrats want and ask for more money” to perform pre-determined 
tasks. (Blais and Dijon, 1991, p. 356). There is little evidence, however, of pressure to 
increase the size of bureau personnel. Inter-bureau personnel mobility is high, hence the 
head of a relatively small bureau can more readily improve his position by moving on to 
head one that is larger or more prestigious than by expanding his own bureau. 
Subordinate bureaucrats have little to gain from the expansion of the size of their 
organization, because their advancement depends primarily on their initial qualifications 
and on the length of service (Margolis, 1975). Likewise, there is little evidence that 
bureaucrats seek to expand the scope of bureau activities (Sigleman, 1986). On the 
                                                 
18 See in particular, Fiorina and Noll (1978), Romer and Rosenthal (1978), Mackay and Weaver (1981), and 
Miller and Moe (1983) 
For a comprehensive  survey  see Gill (1995) 
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contrary,  “Senior executives are less likely than the general public to favor increases in 
spending on the vast majority of government programs, contrary to the assumptions about 
self-interested bureaucratic behavior” (Dolan, 2002). 
 
Niskanen was also criticized for basing his arguments  on idiosyncratic US 
institutions, such as “the existence of relatively autonomous agencies having direct 
relationships with their legislative sponsors, and to some extent on that sponsor being 
structured in an equally decentralized manner”(Peters, 1991 p. 305)19.Yet bureaucratic 
over-expansion is said to occur in countries with institutions quite alien to those of the 
United States, including benevolent and malevolent dictatorships. And even if one 
focuses only on the United States it is far from clear what is the nature of the political 
process that limits expansion to the point at which the marginal product of a bureau is 
zero, or at which the bureau exhausted consumers surplus (whichever comes earlier). 
 
Last but not least, few people in the United States (or elsewhere) complain that  
there is too much Law and Order, that in the public schools  the teacher/student ratio is 
too high, or that the Postal System deliveries are too frequent.  The common complaint is  
not that government bureaus do too much, but that there are too many bureaucrats and 
that they sluggishly  perform their jobs. 
 
Experience, reflection, and the contributions of other scholars, led Noskanen to 
modify his hypothesis of the causes and consequences of over-expansion of  bureaucracy. 
According to the later version,  
                                                 
19 Niskanen may also be faulted for failing to explain how the political mechanism determines the boundary 
conditions of bureau expansion. 
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“[B]ureaucrats act to maximize their bureau’s discretionary budget  defined as the 
difference  between the total budget and the minimum cost of producing the output 
expected by the political authorities…[T]he surplus is spent in ways that serve  the 
interests of the bureaucrats and the political authorities” ( Niskanen, 1991, pp.18-19)20 
 
Niskanen now outlines the mechanics of over-expansion in seven points:: 
 
1. The bureaucrats’ behavior differs from that of other Economic Agents because 
bureaucrats face “incentives and constraints that are specific to bureaus” 
 
2.” Most bureaus face a monopoly buyer of their service, usually some group of political 
officials. The effective demand for the output of a bureau is that of his political sponsor, 
rather than that of the ultimate consumer of this service.” 
 
3. “Most bureaus are monopoly suppliers of their service.” 
 
4. “The bilateral monopoly relation between a bureau and its sponsor involves the 
exchange of a promised output for a budget, rather than the sale of its output at a per-unit 
price. As in any bilateral monopoly, there is no unique budget-output equilibrium 
between that preferred by the sponsor and that preferred by the bureau. The sponsor’s 
primary advantages in this bargaining are its authority to replace the bureau’s 
management team… The bureau’s primary advantage is that it has much better 
information about the costs of supplying the service than does the sponsor.” 
 
6. The sponsor uses “its authority primarily to capture part of the bureau’s surplus in 
ways that serve the specific interests of the sponsor group, rather than the  interests . 
of the broader group of legislators and voters” 
 
7. “[N]either the members of the sponsor group nor the bureaucrats have a pecuniary 
share in any surplus generated by the bureau. The effect of this condition is that the 
surplus will be spent in ways that indirectly serve the interests of the sponsor and the 
bureau, but not as direct compensation. (Ibid.  pp. 16-17) 
 
 The revised version is more readily acceptable, yet it fails to yield the sharp 
conclusions of the original formulation. These can be re-captured through a simple model 
based on the assumptions that (1) governments, regardless of the type of regime seek 
                                                 




support to maintain themselves in power, and (2) that patronage is one of the means of 
gaining support. 
 
 The professionalization of the civil service notwithstanding, in every regime some 
administrative positions are filled through a political process. to reward  influential 
individuals. The qualifications  of the appointees are of secondary importance: the goal of 
the appointments are to gain (or to maintain) support. The loss of efficiency is the 
economic cost of the political support.  
 To explore the implications of the spoils system, let us assume, for the sake of 
simplicity, that all the government posts are filled by a Ruler, who may be an elected 
official, a hereditary monarch, or a modern dictator. The public sector job-holders 
support the Ruler. But the public sector is financed at the expense of the private sector, 
hence the Ruler, seeking to maximize support S has to take into account the impact of 
public sector job creation on national income. Assuming that private sector labor LP and 
public sector labor  LG are drawn from the same pool L, we can express the Ruler’s 
objective function as: 
Max S = S(LG , Y ( LP ,LG))    LG+ LP = L     (13)  




LG+ LP = L 
 At political optimum  
  ∂S/∂LG  = - (∂S/∂Y)(dY/d LG )       (14) 
Since ∂S/∂LG > 0 and ∂S/∂Y> 0, it follows that  dY/dLG <0.  But  at economic optimum   
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dY/dLG = 0 and d2Y/d LG2 < 0. It follows, therefore, that the politically optimal level of  
public sector employment exceed the level that is economically optimal. This result 
conforms to Niskanen’s original hypothesis, but  it does not depend on the bureaucrats’ 
bureau size maximizing behavior. 
 
 Let us now take into account the fact, that in the case of political appointments the 
qualifications of the appointees are of  secondary importance, and  let  λ ≤ 1 to be the 
coefficient  expressing the difference between the effectiveness of professional civil 
servants and that of political  appointees. Making use, once again, of the Findlay-Wilson 
model (see (6) to (8) above)  we can write the Ruler’s  objective function as: 
Max U = b LG + (1-b)A(λLG )F( K, LP)                 (15) 
     LG     
 
Subject to LG + LP = L  
where b (0≤b≤1) is the weight attached by politicians to the support of public sector job-
holders, and  (1-b) to the level of national income. It should be noted that this formulation 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the ruler not only needs support (which he gains by 
making political appointments) but that he also cares about the well-being of the polity as 
a whole (to which he attaches a weight of (1-b)21 
 
 Treating If λ as a constant22 we see that, at political optimum,     
 A’F – A∂F/∂LP = b/(1-b)λ       (16) 
The greater the political benefit derived from the dispensation of patronage (the higher 
                                                 
21 For a recent discussion of the political objective function, see Milo (2001) 
22 Since we assume that public sector employment has diminishing returns., we cannot obtain any 
additional insights  by recognizing the fact that the efficiency of the public sector is likely to be the lower, 
the larger the number of political appointments, or, in our terms that λ(LG) and  λ’>0. 
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the b), and the lesser the weight attached to the competence of the political appointees, 
the greater the difference between the marginal product of labor in the private and the 
public sector. Since the marginal product in both sectors declines, it follows that the 
higher the b, the greater the degree of over-expansion of the bureaucracy. The 
appointment of politically important incompetents reduces the effectiveness of public 
sector production and national income23 
    
7. The problem of loyalty, and trust. 
Bureaucrats, Breton and Wintrobe claim, are neither inherently efficient, nor 
inherently inefficient. They behave selectively, where “Selective behavior... is the 
capacity of subordinates to be sometimes efficient and sometimes inefficient in pursuing 
the goals or objectives of their superiors”. (Breton and Wintrobe, p.37).  Efficient 
behavior is defined by Breton and Wintrobe in terms of fulfillment of tasks assigned to a 
bureaucrat by his immediate superior; inefficient behavior - in terms of the bureaucrat 
pursuing his own goals. To avoid confusion, we shall use the terms loyal and disloyal 
behavior to designate, respectively, an Agent’s effort devoted to performance of tasks 
assigned by the organization, and the effort devoted to the pursuit of own goals.24   
Let us draw a distinction between states of nature which, from the point of the 
organization are “good” and those which are “bad”. The “Good” state is expected to 
occur with probability πG , and the bad state with probability  πB = (1- πG ).   All  Agents  
behave loyally in the “Good” state. In a “Bad” state, a proportion of Agents χ behaves 
                                                 
23  Alternately, we may look at the Niskanen process as a “game” between politicians seeking to expand patronage, 
and a parliament seeking to limit tax collected to finance public sector employment.     
24 In what follows we shall abstract from differences in socio-psychological make-up which determine an 
Agent’s tendency to act loyally of disloyally under the same circumstances, and focus on the opportunity 
cost of the alternate modes of behavior 
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loyally, while  (1- χ ) is disloyal. An Agent is the more likely to act disloyally, the higher 
the expected payoff from such behavior, relative to the payoff from loyal behavior, the 
lower the probability of being punished for disloyalty, and the lower the penalty for 
disloyalty. When an Agent acts disloyally, he puts forth zero effort in the work for the 
organization which employs him. The head of the organization engages Agents before the 
“State of Nature” is known. He is able to mete out punishment  e.g. by discharging  an 
employee if and  when his disloyal behavior is detected, but, while the “Bad” state lasts, 
he cannot replace disloyal employees by other hires. As a consequence, if an employee 
acts disloyally, his output, and that of his subordinates, is lost to the enterprise. We shall 
assume that the heads of the organizations are risk-neutral; the conclusions hold a fortiori 
if they are risk-averse.  
 
Consider first the case in which the head of the organization cannot determine ex 
ante whether an Agent will be loyal or disloyal. This means that any Agent he hires will 
behave loyally with probability χπB ,.i.e that the effective labor force will be  χπB n where 
n is the total number of employees. Assuming, to simplify the exposition, that there exists 
a metric for the measurement of output, an Ai-type  head of an organization will form a 2-
layer structure and hire n*  Aj-type workers if: 
Rij= n*( χπB aij – aj) ≥ai        (17) 
From which it can be seen that the higher the probability of disloyal behavior, the lower 
the organization’s rent. 
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In the case of a three-layer organization one of the n* bureaucrats will perform 
disloyally with probability (1- χ)(1-πB ) idling the n worker team under his supervision 
.Of the remaining  (n*2 –n)  production workers a proportion (1- χ)(1-πB) is also expected 
to remain idle. Thus the effective labor force would be (χπB n*)2 The  rent from a 3-tier 
organization is:  
 Rijk =  (χπB n*)2 aijk –( n*aj  +n*ak)      (18) 
Subtracting (17) from (18) we  obtain the  profitability condition: 
( Rijk - Rij  ) = (χπB n*)2 aijk –( n*aj  +n*ak) -  n*( χπB aij – aj) ≥0    
Assuming, as was done above (see (5)) that the pass-through process can be represented 
by  
aij =  αai+ (1-α) aj  
we obtain: 
( Rijk - Rij  ) = (χπB n*α)( χπB n*α- 1)[ a0 + a1( 1 – α)/α ] - n a1(n-1) 
which shows that the advantage of a three-level over a two-level organization is the 
greater, the higher the probability that the employees will behave loyally. The possibility 
of disloyal behavior thus reduces the advantage of a hierarchic organization, and it 
“flattens” the structure. 
 
The ability to categorize potential employees into those who are loyal, and those 
who are disloyal  is clearly to the employer’s advantage: “Trust can dramatically reduce 
both transaction costs – replacing contracts with handshakes- and agency risks- replacing 
the fear of shirking and misrepresentation with mutual confidence” (Adler, 2001, p. 219)  
Insofar as higher hierarchic posts command higher salary or bring greater  psychic utility, 
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it is also to the advantage of potential employees to be considered to be loyal, i.e. to gain 
the  trust of the prospective employer  Breton and Wintrobe suggest that trust  can be 
earned: 
“Assume... that all transactions take the form of $1 loans. Then  if A has the belief atb or 
is confident in the same degree that B will honor or repay $1 (plus interest) at some 
specified time in the future, we say that A has an amount atb of trust in B”(Breton and 
Wintrobe, op. cit. p. 65).  
 
Trustworthiness is a question of  the sum involved as well as of the  degree of confidence 
that the implicit contract will be honored. The larger the number of  $1 loans B has 
repaid, the greater A’s confidence that he will repay such future loans. But such a record 
would not necessarily mean that A would be equally confident if B asked him for a 
$1,000 loan. 
 
 Trust can also be won through  voluntary acceptance of a contract specifying 
severe  punishment for disloyalty. Let the contract offered to potential employees specify  
such a punishment ĸ. An individual who would not act disloyally in a “Bad” state of 
nature would accept the contract, provided the wage offered exceeds his self-employment 
opportunity cost. Since he will not act disloyally, he does not take into account the 
disutility of punishment. Not so the disloyal individual who, in deciding whether to 
participate or not, takes into account the utility of disloyal behavior in case of a  “Bad” 
state of nature. A sufficiently  severe punishment would force him to act loyally, thus 
reducing his utility, and making the offer unattractive. 
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 To the above one may object that k the maximum socially permissible punishment  
may not be sufficiently severe  to deter disloyalty.  However, in a heterogeneous society, 
the  disutility of punishment may differ among  social  groups. The mutual trust of  
members of closely-knit communities, such as medieval Jewish or Arab merchants,  or of 
certain contemporary overseas Indian and Chinese communities, may be explained in 
terms of the threat of exclusion in case of disloyalty. Even in open societies, on which 
exclusion is no threat, it may  be possible to devise institutions the membership in which 
bestows privileges, but which inflict severe punishment on disloyal members. For 
instance,  the Communist Party in the Soviet Union bestowed privileges on its members, 
but individuals who were excluded from the Party found themselves in a much worse 
position than those who never were members.  
 
 Let us now examine a situation in which the Principal can identify in advance 
whether the potential employees are loyal (AL) or disloyal (AD). He also knows that AL –
type individuals have ability  aL , and  AD –type individuals  ability aD, where aL <  aD25.  
Take a 3-level organization whose head is an A0 –type and which is staffed entirely with 
AL-individuals. The output  such an organization  can be written as: 
Q(L)= n2 a0LL 
where  n2  is the number of production workers and a0LL  is the output of an AL-type 
worker supervised by an AL-type bureaucrat working for an A0 –type principal. 
Assuming, as  earlier that the pass-through of technological knowledge from an Ai –type 
supervisor to an Aj –type supervisee can be expressed as  (5) above,  the output of such 
an enterprise can be expressed as: 
                                                 
25 The case in which  aL ≥ aD is trivial            
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 Q(L) =  n2{α2a0 + α( 1 – α) aL+ ( 1 – α) aL }  
Could output be raised by  replacing  one employee by an AD – type, and, if so, at 
what level should he be placed? If , in a three-layer organization, one AL – supervisor 
were replaced by an AD –type supervisor, output would rise by  n(a012 - a022 ) with 
probability  πB , and it would decline by  na022  with probability (1 - πB ). The expected 
change in output is therefore equal to: 
∆Q DS = πB n(a012 - a022 ) – n(1 - πB ) a022 = πB na012 - na022 .  
Output will increase as long as: ∆Q DS  > 0, that is, as long as: 
πB (DS) > a022/ a012 
If, instead, the  AD –type  were to replace an AL –type a022 worker, output would increase  
by  a021 - a022 with probability πB , and it would decrease by  a022 with probability (1 - πB). 
The expected change in output is therefore equal to: 
∆Q DW = πB (a021 - a022 ) – (1 - πB ) a022 = πB na021 - na022 . 
 
Output will increase as long as: ∆Q WS  > 0, that is, as long as: 
πB (DW) > a022/ a021  
To appraise the relative magnitudes of πB (DS)  and of   πB (DW)  it is necessary, once 
again, to specify the pass-through function. Assuming, as before, that the pass-through 
function can be expressed as in (5) we obtain: 
 (a012 - a021 ) = (1+α2 ) (a2 - a1 ).  
But since a2 < a1 this expression is always negative, which means that  a012 < a021 , hence 
the critical value of  πB (DW)  is higher than that of πB (DS) . If there is a high probability of 
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occurrence of a “Bad” State of nature, it is preferable to place able, but disloyal, 
individuals in lower than in higher hierarchic positions.  
 
Whether it is worth giving a disloyal individual any hierarchic post depends on 
his relative efficiency . The higher the productivity of an AD –type relative to that of an  
AL –type, the more risk of disloyalty is worth bearing. This may explain the fact that even 
in the Soviet Union some exceptionally able individuals whose loyalty to the regime may 
have been open to doubt occupied positions of prestige and power.  
.  
8. Summary and conclusions 
  In this paper we built a simple model to demonstrate that  bureaucratic-hierarchic  
organizations are  efficient provided that they can costlessly solve the Principal-Agent 
problem. Under the pressure of competition profit-oriented enterprises  adopt least-cost 
reward-cum-punishment “packages” that satisfy the participation constraints of Agents 
who have the choice of self-employment. In the case of Government Bureaus and of 
other non-profit entities, the absence of a simple metric of success makes it difficult to 
appraise performance, and increases the probability of favoritism. The professionalization 
of the civil service reduces the likelihood of bias – but at the cost of efficiency. 
 
Max Weber, and most of his followers and  critics,  assumed that bureaucratic 
structures were built to achieve  goals set by outside authorities, such as enterprise 
owners or government officials.  Niskanen advanced the startling ideas that the objective 
of politicians as well as bureaucrats was to maximize the size of the bureaus. At a later 
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stage Niskanen retreated from his earlier assertions. We utilize a simple politico-
economic model which recaptures Niskanen’s original results while meeting the 
objections of his critics. Finally we show that in hierarchic organizations loyalty of the 
Agents plays a major role. This explains why in such structures as the Soviet 
“Nomenklatura” highly qualified but untrustworthy individuals were, typically, confined 
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